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Measuring the quality of judgement and decision-making in nursing
Aim. This paper discusses measurement of the quality of judgement and decision-
making in nursing research. It examines theoretical and research issues surrounding
how to measure judgement accuracy as a component of evaluating decision-making
in nursing practice.
Discussion. Judgement accuracy is discussed with reference to different methods of
measurement, including comparing judgements with independent criteria and inter-
judge approaches. Existing research on how judgement accuracy has been measured
in nursing practice is examined. Evaluation of decisions is then discussed, including
consideration of the process of decision-making and evaluating decision outcomes.
Finally, existing research on decision-making in nursing is assessed and the strengths
and limitations of different types of measurement discussed.
Conclusion. We suggests that researchers examining the quality of judgement and
decision-making in nursing need to be aware of both the strengths and limitations of
existing methods of measurement. We also suggest that researchers need to use a
number of different methods, including normative approaches such as Bayes’ The-
orem and Subjective Expected Utility Theory.
Keywords: clinical decision-making, clinical judgement, nursing
Introduction
Nurses and midwives, like all health care professionals, have
had to adapt to the increased emphasis on evidence-based
health care decisions in clinical practice. Recent policy
changes and trends in professional development mean that
nurses need to recognize that the decisions they make have a
significant impact on health care outcomes and patients’
experiences (Department of Health 2000). Whilst knowledge
of the means of generating the evidence for practice is
relatively well developed, our understanding of how nurses
use this knowledge in their clinical decisions and judgements
is comparatively sparse. The increasingly blurred boundaries
between health care professions mean that nurses’ judge-
ments and decisions have more potential than ever to impact
on patients’ lives and experiences. How we measure the
accuracy or ‘goodness’ of nurses’ judgements and decisions is
therefore of prime importance.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss ways of measuring
the quality of judgement and decision-making in nursing. It
first discusses theoretical approaches to measuring judgement
accuracy and evaluating decision-making, before analysing
how this has been approached in the nursing literature.
Although judgement and decision-making are closely linked,
we have dealt with the two concepts separately. This is
because they generate separate cognitive demands, and pose
unique and distinct challenges for researchers seeking to
describe and evaluate them.
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Literature search
As a starting point for the paper a literature search was
carried out in CINAHL (1982–November 2002) and Medline
(1966–2002), using key word searches and limited by
language and type of publication (Table 1). Studies were
selected on the basis that they were reports of research that
used some form of measurement to examine the accuracy of
judgement or evaluate decisions in nursing, with an explicit
comparison of judgements or decisions with some form of
criterion. The 17 studies that were identified form the basis of
the discussion of measurement issues.
Judgements and decisions
One way of looking at judgement is as ‘an assessment
between alternatives’ (Dowie 1993). Maule (2001) suggests
that the process of judgement involves the integration of
different aspects of information about a person, object or
situation to arrive at an overall evaluation. Therefore the
central question for those researching judgement is, ‘How do
nurses use different types of clinical information about the
patient (how they look, their vital sign readings, their medical
condition, their behaviour) to arrive at a judgement of the
patient’s current health status?’. This field of research also
considers how individuals make predictions about risk, such
as how likely it is that a patient will develop a pressure ulcer.
As opposed to the assessment of information, decisions
have been defined as ‘a choice between alternatives’ (Dowie
1993). The research emphasis here is how people choose
particular courses of action, especially in situations of
uncertainty where the consequences of their actions are
unknown (Goldstein & Hogarth 1997). In nursing an
example of a clinical decision might be the choice of wound
care product for use with an individual patient.
It is important to distinguish between these two concepts.
For instance a nurse or midwife may make an accurate
judgement (e.g. ‘this patient is in extreme pain’) but then
choose a poor quality action, i.e. make a ‘bad’ decision (e.g.
I’ll give them a heat pad). Equally they may make a poor
judgement (‘this person’s chest pain is due to indigestion’,
when actually it is cardiac pain) but make a good decision on
the basis of the poor judgement (‘I’ll give them medication for
indigestion’). In this instance the nurse made a perfectly
reasonable decision given the information available: the
wrong diagnosis. Of course, what most clinicians strive for
is the synergistic state of both judgements and decisions being
of ‘good’ quality. For example, the individual’s current
situation is assessed accurately and appropriate action taken
on the basis of that assessment (‘this person has extreme chest
pain, so I will give them morphine and do an ECG’).
Quality of judgement
Accuracy as quality of judgement
Hastie and Rasinski (1988) define judgement accuracy as
having no errors, being correct, or deviating only slightly but
within acceptable limits from a standard. They go on to
suggest that analysing the accuracy of judgements requires
three elements:
• the judgement, response or assertion under consideration,
• the standard or criterion of truth and
• the rule specifying the correspondence relation between the
judgement and the criterion.
Cooksey (1996) argues that an individual’s ability to make
correct judgements is a function of three things:
• how predictable the world is,
• how well the judges know the world (i.e. their knowledge
base) and
• how consistently judges apply their knowledge.
One theoretical framework uniting these assumptions and
providing a way of measuring judgement accuracy is social
judgement theory (SJT). Central to this is the idea that an
individual’s judgement relate to the reality of a social
environment and can be conceptualized as a ‘lens’. Moreover,
this idea of a lens (Figure 1) can be used to model the ways in
which various forms of information relate to the ‘reality’ of a
given judgement environment and how individuals use
information to arrive at their judgements. The model suggests
that the ‘ecological’ situation (what is wrong with the patient
for instance) is on the left hand side of the model. There are a
variety of different pieces of information (cues) that are
probabilistically related to this ecological situation (e.g. the
patient’s signs and symptoms), with different importance or
weight attached to them. The judge uses these cues to make a
judgement (the right hand side of the model). The judgement
outcome is a function of how the cues have been used. If the
cues are weighted in the same way by the judge as they are
linked to the ecological situation, then the judgement will be
more accurate. If the judge weights the cues differently, then
Table 1 Search strategy
1. Judgement OR Judgment
2. Decision
3. 1 OR 2
4. Nurse OR Nursing
5. 3 AND 4
6. Limited to RESEARCH
7. Limited to English language
D. Dowding and C. Thompson
50  2003 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Journal of Advanced Nursing, 44(1), 49–57
their judgement will not reflect the ecological situation and be
less accurate. Regression techniques are used to derive a
statistical equation or algorithm revealing how much weight
is attached to each item of information related to the
ecological situation, or used in the judgement (Cooksey
1996).
Measuring judgement quality
Criterion and basic logic approaches
Basic logic (Hastie & Rasinski 1988) approaches to mea-
suring judgement rely on the definition of the judgement task,
measuring the criterion, independently measuring the sub-
ject’s judgement and comparing the judgement with the
criterion. This can be done in two ways: through social
judgement approaches or probabilistic methods.
Social judgement approaches use the relationship between
the information and outcomes of interest as the basis for
establishing the criterion (the left hand side of the lens). The
way this is typically represented is through the use of linear
models, developed through regressing information cues onto
the criterion (Engel et al. 1990). Linear models constructed in
this way give a measure of task predictability, providing an
upper limit on how well we can then expect an individual
judge to perform when they are making judgements within
this particular context (Engel et al. 1990, Cooksey 1996,
Dawes 2000, Harries & Harries 2001). For example, Moore
et al. (1996) suggest that only 80% of all falls in older
patients are predictable. In this instance a criterion of being
able to predict 80% of the falls that occur would indicate
accurate judgement. Individuals are then assessed against a
judgement task based on the modelled environmental reality.
The assessment provides a picture of the information they use
and the weightings they attach to the information used in
reaching their judgement (again using linear regression
models). Despite arguments that actual cognitive processes
may be more complex than simple linear equations, linear
models have consistently been shown to provide an accurate
description of many judgement processes, including that most
complex of health care activities, diagnosis (de Dombal 1988,
Hastie & Dawes 2001).
Probabilistic methods can also be used to assess accuracy
of judgement. For instance, the likelihood of an individual
having a particular condition can be calculated from existing
data (Jungermann 2000) and compared with a judge’s
evaluation of the likelihood of an individual having the
condition. Normative approaches such as Bayes’ theorem
(Hastie & Dawes 2001) can provide the probability of an
individual having a particular medical diagnosis, given the
prevalence of the disease in the population and the informa-
tion provided by test results. The criterion in this instance
would be the predictions made by the normative model
(Bayes’ theorem) and performance would be compared
against this. Probabilistic approaches rely on the availability
of data sets that can provide the necessary frequency data
with which to evaluate the accuracy of judgements made by
individuals.
Inter-judge comparisons
An alternative approach to measuring the accuracy of
judgement is by comparing the judgements of separate judges
and examining them for agreement. The assumption here is
that, if they disagree, one of them must be in error (Hastie &
Rasinski 1988). There is no independent criterion in this
approach and so there is always the possibility that both in-
dividuals may be in error. Inter-judge approaches can lead to
systematic measurement errors, and so it is clearly advanta-
geous for those considering researching the accuracy of
clinical judgement to use independent criterion approaches.
We now turn to how these approaches have been employed in
looking at the measurement of judgement by nurses.
Measuring judgements in nursing practice
Basic logic approaches
Studies within this approach have used two types of criterion
measure against which to examine nurses’ judgements, one
being actual patient outcome/condition and the other being a
measurement of patient status. Seven studies have been
identified that use the actual patient condition or outcome as
a measure against which nurses’ judgements have been
X 4
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X 1
YsYe
Achievement (ra)
Criterion Judgement
Validity Cue
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Cues
Figure 1 Brunswik’s lens model (Hammond 1975, p. 274). Ye is the
criterion or actual patient state. X1Xn are the cues which are related
to that patient state. They may vary in importance or ‘weight’ with
regard to their relationship to the patient state. Ys is the persons
judgement about the criterion or patient state. They may use the cues
Xn in a different way to how they are actually related to Ye. ra is the
persons achievement.
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assessed (Kruse et al. 1988, Rosenthal et al. 1992, Moore
et al. 1996, VandenBosch et al. 1996, Marsden 2000, Moyer
et al. 2000, Allen-Davis et al. 2002) and three other
measurements of patient status (McDonald et al. 1999, Reid
& Chappell 2000, O’Brien et al. 2001).
Four of the studies examine nurses’ diagnostic accuracy,
comparing their performance to actual patient diagnoses
established via laboratory tests (Rosenthal et al. 1992, Moyer
et al. 2000, Allen-Davis et al. 2002) or diagnosis determined
from patient notes (Marsden 2000). Allen-Davis et al. (2002)
examined nurses’ ability to diagnose vulvovaginal complaints
over the telephone compared with actual diagnosis deter-
mined by laboratory tests. Rosenthal et al. (1992) compared
nurse practitioners’ probability estimates of whether women
had chlamydial infection following an examination to results
from a swab analysed by a virology laboratory. Moyer et al.
(2000) asked paediatric nurse practitioners to provide judge-
ments on the presence of neonatal jaundice on the basis of a
physical examination, and compared them with serum
bilirubin concentration measurements. All of these studies
were carried out in the United States of America, and it is not
clear whether nurses would normally be expected to make
such diagnoses or assessments without the additional infor-
mation provided by laboratory tests. Rosenthal et al. (1992)
used linear modelling to identify the weighting of clinical cues
that were associated with actual infection, and the weighting
of the cues that nurses used to make their probability
judgements. This allowed them to identify potential reasons
for judgement error in the nurses they studied, including
inconsistent use of information and over/underestimation of
the importance of some clinical cues.
Marsden (2000) compared the provisional telephone diag-
nosis of nurse practitioners practising in an eye department to
patients’ subsequent diagnosis. This study was carried out in
the United Kingdom, using a retrospective secondary data
analysis of patient triage records, hospital records and
subsequent visits, with the researcher interpreting whether
or not the diagnosis made by the nurse was appropriate or
not.
The strength of these studies is that they all use patient
outcomes as a measure against which to compare nurses’
judgements. They also have outcome data for a reasonably
large sample of patients [492 women (Rosenthal et al. 1992),
253 women (Allen-Davis et al. 2002), 122 healthy infants
(Moyer et al. 2000), 461 patients (Marsden 2000)]. However,
the number of practitioners involved in the studies is
comparatively small (four in Rosenthal et al. 1992, seven in
Marsden 2000) or not stated at all (Moyer et al. 2000, Allen-
Davis et al. 2002). For three of the studies it is unclear
whether these tasks are ones which nurses would normally be
expected to carry out (Rosenthal et al. 1992, Moyer et al.
2000, Allen-Davis et al. 2002) and for the other there are
questions about relying on patient notes as the source of data
and researcher interpretation of the notes as a way of
measuring judgement accuracy (Marsden 2000).
The remaining three studies all compare nurses’ risk
predictions of patient status with whether or not the patient
developed the outcome of interest. Moore et al. (1996) asked
nurses to estimate, at the time of admission to hospital, a
patient’s risk of falling (low, medium or high) and then
compared this to whether patients actually fell or not,
identified through hospital incident reports and audit forms.
Kruse et al. (1988) asked nurses to estimate, at the time of
admission to an intensive care unit, the risk of a patient dying
whilst in hospital, and then looked at patient outcomes
(whether they survived or died). They placed probability
judgements into two categories to carry out the comparison,
with judgements above 50% equating to ‘die’ and below to
‘survive’. VandenBosch et al. (1996) asked nurses to provide
a yes/no response about whether or not they thought that a
patient would develop a pressure ulcer whilst in hospital,
then followed patients up to see if they subsequently
developed ulcers.
All of these studies were carried out in the USA, with the
number of assessments and patients taking part in the studies
varying from 39 patients (187 pairs of judgements) (Moore
et al. 1996), to 103 patients (VandenBosch et al. 1996) and
366 patients (Kruse et al. 1988). None of the studies provide
details of the number of nurses who provided risk judgements
about the patients. Again, one of the strengths of these studies
is that they are using patient outcomes as a measure of
judgement accuracy. However, when examining risk predic-
tion accuracy there are two issues that also need to be taken
into account, and that were not addressed by any of these
studies. The first is the predictability of the condition in the
first place. Moore et al. (1996) suggest that only 80% of falls
can be predicted (but fail to provide evidence for this figure),
and neither Kruse et al. (1988) nor VandenBosch et al. (1996)
give any insight into what a reasonable level of prediction
might be in these circumstances. The second issue concerns
the effect of preventative action when an individual is
identified as being at risk (Papanikolaou et al. 2002). When
using patient outcomes from a situation where the task is
prediction of risk, it is unclear what effect interventions taken
to reduce that risk may have had on the outcome. It is
therefore difficult to assess how accurate initial risk predic-
tions made by practitioners may have been.
Of the three studies that use other measurements of patient
status, two use comparisons with a patient-completed meas-
urement tool (McDonald et al. 1999, O’Brien et al. 2001) and
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one a researcher-completed measurement tool (Reid &
Chappell 2000). McDonald et al. (1999) asked patients to
complete the Zung self-rating depression scale, and compared
these levels of depression with nurses’ ratings of levels of
depression. Similarly O’Brien et al. (2001) asked patients to
rate their own anxiety using the Spielberger State Anxiety
Index, and compared these ratings to nurses’ assessments as
recorded in medical records. Reid and Chappell (2000) filled
out the revised multi-focus assessment scale on the basis of
information they obtained from interviews with patients with
dementia and their families, and then compared the results to
assessments of level of dementia obtained via Directors of
Nursing.
The methods used in these studies are different from those
measuring patient outcomes directly, in that they are inter-
ested in patient characteristics that are difficult to determine
without some form of assessment scale. All of the studies
assume that the patient measurements are reliable and valid.
They also vary considerably in how they measure nurses’
judgements using direct assessment (McDonald et al. 1999);
the assesment of directors of nursing who may or may not
have consulted with other nursing staff (Reid & Chappell
2000); or what was written in the patient’s medical notes
(O’Brien et al. 2001). Sample sizes vary from 1109 patients
and 40 nurses (McDonald et al. 1999), through 510 patients
(Reid & Chappell 2000) to 40 patients (O’Brien et al. 2001).
The main issue with these types of studies is whether the
criterion used to measure patient status is an accurate
representation of physical or mental state. Two of the studies
would have also benefited from measuring nurses’ judge-
ments directly, rather than depending on written sources or
Directors of Nursing.
Inter-judge comparisons
Studies that have used inter-judge comparisons have primar-
ily used expert panel consensus as the criterion against which
nurses’ judgements have been compared (Aspinall 1979,
Letourneau & Jensen 1998, Gould et al. 2001, Reischman &
Yarandi 2002), although two use the judgements of other
nurses (Westfall et al. 1986, Melchior-MacDougall & Lander
1995) and one uses group consensus obtained via a nominal
group technique (Zou et al. 1998).
All of the studies using expert panel consensus as a gold
standard for nurses’ judgements also use written case
simulations as a method of data collection. Gould et al.
(2001) used four written simulations developed from case
histories of patients to examine nurses’ judgements about
pressure ulcer risk. They used an expert panel to achieve
consensus on the level of risk that each simulation represen-
ted, before asking 236 nurses to make a judgement on the
level of risk. Reischman and Yarandi (2002) similarly used
written patient simulations that had been reviewed by an
expert panel to compare how 23 expert and 23 novice nurses
used information to reach diagnoses for patients in cardio-
vascular critical care. However, they fail to provide detail on
how the diagnostic content was initially obtained.
Aspinall (1979) gave nurses a written case study and asked
them to list the possible causes of the patient’s behaviour. An
expert panel were used to identify which of the 18 possible
disease states (diagnoses) could be a ‘correct’ diagnosis for
the patient. The list of six ‘correct’ diagnoses was then used to
calculate an index of diagnostic accuracy, which was used to
assess the performance of the 90 nurses who took part in the
study. Letourneau and Jensen (1998) used three case studies
previously developed by Melchior-MacDougall and Lander
(1995) to examine 163 home care nurses’ accuracy in wound
staging. They revalidated the case studies using an expert
panel to identify what stage of the wound represented in the
case studies.
As in the studies that use an expert panel to establish the
criterion for judgement, the two studies that use other nurses
to establish criterion also use simulations as a data collection
method. Melchior-MacDougall and Lander (1995) used three
case histories based on actual patient cases, and asked
94 home care nurses to stage the wound. Local practitioners
assessed the accuracy of their judgements. Westfall et al.
(1986) used patient simulations based on actual patient cases
to examine 43 nursing students’ and nurses’ diagnostic
reasoning, assessing whether or not they generated accurate
hypotheses or diagnoses for the patient cases. The research
team and nurses providing the information for the simula-
tions determined the criterion for accuracy a priori. In
contrast, Zou et al. (1998) asked nurses to assess patients
for the presence of delirium before they took part in a
multi-professional group that established a consensus on
87 patients’ actual diagnoses.
Using simulations has strengths as a method of data
collection, in that all subjects see the same cases and so
judgements can be compared easily. However, there are
issues of representativeness, in that it is uncertain how close
to reality such simulations are, and whether or not judge-
ments made in these environments are representative of those
made in ‘real life’ (Lamond et al. 1996). Expert panels can be
a useful mechanism for establishing a criterion for perform-
ance, especially in areas such as pressure ulcer risk, where
considering actual patient outcomes is not without its
limitations. However, one has to be aware that expert
consensus by its nature means that some individuals may
have compromised their own judgements to reach
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agreement – which may mean that it does not represent the
‘best’ judgement in every situation. This is similarly the case
with studies that use a nominal group technique to establish
consensus. Establishing accuracy using a form of peer review
may provide an insight into what is considered ‘good’
practice in that particular context or setting, but this limits
the standard to existing performance rather than trying to
identify whether new levels of achievement are possible
(Gonzalez 2001).
The ‘goodness’ of decisions
What makes a good decision?
Defining decisions as good or bad is problematic, mainly
because nurses operate in an environment that is character-
ized by uncertainty (Buckingham & Adams 2000). Baron
(2000) suggests that the best decisions are those that yield the
best consequences for achieving people’s goals. However,
evaluating decisions by their outcomes can be misleading as a
measure of quality (Pauker & Pauker 1999, Sox 1999), as the
outcome may have occurred by chance, although the decision
was the ‘best’ one for the individual at the time. Another
alternative to measuring decisions is to evaluate the process
by which the decision has been made (Pauker & Pauker
1999). However, this is also problematic, as it ignores the
outcome of the decision and raises the issue of what makes a
‘good’ decision process. Hastie and Dawes (2001) suggest
that good decisions are those in which the process follows the
laws of logic and probability theory. Normative theories,
such as subjective expected utility theory (SEUT) could be
considered an optimum process by which to make decisions.
SEUT explicitly takes the decision-maker’s values or beliefs
into account (Dowie 1993), and follows a rational process
that includes the probability of various outcomes occurring,
before identifying the optimum decision for that individual
(Tavakoli et al. 1999).
Evaluating decisions
There are a number of ways in which decisions can be
evaluated, including examining the outcome of the decision,
the decision process itself, or comparing decisions either to
some form of normative model or to another individual. As
has already been highlighted, evaluating the outcome of a
decision can be problematic as it could be determined by
chance events (Pauker & Pauker 1999, Sox 1999). However,
Sox (1999) suggests it may be reasonable to evaluate the
decision-maker with reference to the outcomes of many
decisions (as one can then consider average performance). If
the decision process is being evaluated as a measure of
quality, then an idea of what should be included in that
process is necessary. Pauker and Pauker (1999) suggest that
the process should be explicit, define the decision problem,
identify the goals of the decision-maker, specify the con-
sequences and relative values of the outcomes for each
option, examine the trade-offs between each of the strategies
and include all relevant parties in the process.
When comparing decisions to a normative model such as
SEUT, it is assumed that the normative model is following
a ‘good’ decision process. If the choice the decision-maker
has made is evaluated against the recommendation of the
normative model and they agree, then it could be consid-
ered ‘good’. However, it is necessary to be aware that the
agreement may have resulted by chance (Sox 1999). If
decisions are compared between decision-makers, perhaps
with some form of expert performance as a gold standard,
then what is being suggested is that the expert is using
what is considered to be a ‘good’ process (Lipshitz et al.
2001). However, similar concerns to those raised in the
section on judgement quality are attached to using
inter-judge comparisons as a means of assessing decision
quality.
Evaluating decisions in nursing practice
Studies that have attempted to evaluate the decision-making
of nurses have typically used one main strategy; that of
comparing nurses’ decisions to a ‘gold standard’ either
determined through expert consensus, peer evaluation or
what happened to the patient.
Three studies have examined the appropriateness of nurse
triage decision-making (Leprohon & Patel 1995, Considine
et al. 2000, Quinn et al. 2000). Considine et al. (2000) used
10 scenarios based on patient cases to investigate the
appropriateness of triage decisions in 31 nurses. Triage
decisions were compared with those established via expert
panel consensus. In a different study, Leprohon and Patel
(1995) examined the case records of telephone triage phone
calls and followed up patients via their notes. This infor-
mation was then given to experts, who were asked to judge
what the optimal decision was for each call, and nurses’
decisions were compared with this. This study examined
34 nurses receiving 50 calls. Quinn et al. (2000) compared
nursing decisions on the suitability of a patient for transfer
out of CCU to a lower dependency ward to patient
outcomes, in order to determine if the decision would have
been appropriate. This study examined 506 patients, but
does not provide details on the number of nurses that took
part.
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Three of the studies examine nurses’ decision-making
about treatment for wounds and pressure ulcers (Melchior-
MacDougall & Lander 1995, Lamond & Farnell 1998,
Letourneau & Jensen 1998). All of the studies use written
scenarios that include photographs of the wound as a method
of data collection, asking nurses to decide which product they
would use. In the studies by Letourneau and Jensen (1998)
and Lamond and Farnell (1998), nurses’ choices were
compared with those of an expert panels. In the study by
Melchior-MacDougall and Lander (1995), nurses’ choices
were evaluated by local nursing practitioners.
Three remaining studies examine nurses’ drug administra-
tion plans (Corcoran 1986), nurses’ ability to identify
patients suitable for thrombolytic therapy (Quinn et al.
1998), and student nurses’ prioritization of nursing interven-
tions (Shamian 1991). All three studies use written case
histories or vignettes to collect data on decision-making, and
all three use experts as the gold standard against which to
compare nurses’ decisions.
As in the research into judgement, the study by Quinn et al.
(2000) has a strength in that it compares nurses’ decisions to
actual patient outcomes. However, as has already been
discussed, this is problematic in decision research because of
the nature of uncertainty inherent in such decisions. All of the
remaining studies use some form of expert or peer consensus
as the gold standard for decision-making. Again, this has
strengths in that they provide a standard for decision-making
which would generally be seen as matching expert perform-
ance (Lipshitz et al. 2001). However, all these studies fail to
address evaluation of the process of decision-making. Also,
by using simulations or vignettes as the basis of data
collection, the viewpoint of the person for whom the
decisions are being made (the patient) is effectively ignored
in the process.
Discussion
The issue of measuring the quality of judgement and decision-
making in nursing practice is a complex one. Perhaps because
of this complexity, a number of different ways of assessing
judgement accuracy and evaluating decisions have been
employed (to greater or lesser extents) by researchers exam-
ining nurses’ judgements and clinical decisions.
Research examining judgement accuracy uses either
patient outcomes as the criteria of choice or some form of
peer review/expert consensus. Both approaches have their
strengths and limitations. Studies using patient outcomes
need to accommodate the characteristics of the judgement
task within the environment; this includes the predictability
of the task in the first place (Engel et al. 1990, Cooksey
1996, Dawes 2000, Harries & Harries 2001). Interestingly,
existing research tends to focus on examining large numbers
of patients, rather than health professionals. In contrast,
studies that use expert consensus as the gold standard tend
to use simulations or vignettes as the method of data
collection, and therefore sample large numbers of profes-
sionals rather than patients. Using expert consensus also has
its strengths, in that it can provide insight into what is
considered to be the standard of clinical practice for that
situation. However, as Gonzalez (2001) points out, this may
be limiting in that it may be possible to improve on expert
performance.
In contrast, the research on nurse decision-making to date
has almost exclusively focused on the actual choice made by
nurses and compared it with some form of expert or peer
review consensus. As has already been highlighted, evaluating
decisions by their outcomes is problematic because of the
uncertainty inherent in much health care practice. Evaluating
decisions by the process by which they are made has been
suggested as an alternative approach (Pauker & Pauker
1999), but does not appear to have been employed by nursing
researchers to date.
One of the main approaches to measuring the quality of
judgements and evaluating decisions in other areas has been
through the use of more normative theories, based on
probability. This is typified by Bayes’ theorem (Hastie &
Dawes 2001) for judgements and SEUT (Dowie 1993) for
decision-making. None of the research studies we identified
used these models as the criterion against which to compare
nurses’ judgements and decisions. This may be due to the lack
of data to provide statistical databases, or nurses’ lack of
knowledge of such approaches. Although using these types of
model as a gold standard for judgements and decisions has
been questioned (Jungermann 2000), with the debate mainly
surrounding whether or not the ‘objective reality’ that is
suggested by such models actually exists, they can be an
important additional tool for measurement in judgement and
decision-making research.
Conclusion
The measurement of the quality of judgement and decision-
making in nursing practice is highly complicated, and
studies that attempt to examine nurses’ practice need to
acknowledge both the strengths and limitations of the
strategies they employ. Existing research into nursing
judgements has used simplistic measures of patient outcome
as a criterion. Such measures fail to acknowledge the
inherent uncertainty in judgement situations, or rely on
inter-judge comparisons that can lead to systematic errors.
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Future research needs to use methods that can provide a
way of modelling the uncertain nature of judgement tasks,
as well as providing an independent criterion measure for
accuracy. Approaches such as SJT and Bayes’ theorem can
provide a framework for this, as well as providing insight
into potential areas of error which could then be used as the
basis for practice improvement.
Similarly, existing research examining decision-making in
nursing uses measures of outcome (without acknowledging
the limitations of this approach in terms of the inherent
uncertainty in a decision situation), or comparisons with
expert panels, which again may be subject to bias. Measuring
the goodness of decisions is problematic, and needs an
approach that examines both outcomes (which means samp-
ling a large number of decisions) and process. Future research
could use the approach of SEUT as a framework for
examining the decision process, whilst assesing a large
number of decision outcomes. Such techniques offer the
promise of being sensitive to complexity and yet able to
explicate better the ‘goodness’ of nurse decision-making and
decision-makers in practice.
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